Hybrid languages are extended modal languages which can refer to (or even quantify over) worlds. The use of strong hybrid languages dates back to at least Pri67], but recent work (for example BS98, BT99]) has focussed on a more constrained system called H(#; @). The purpose of the present paper is to show in detail that H(#; @) is a modally natural system. We begin by studying its expressivity, and provide both model theoretic characterizations (via a restricted notion of Ehrenfeucht-Fra ss e game, and an enriched notion of bisimulation) and a syntactic characterization (in terms of bounded formulas). The key result to emerge is that H(#; @) corresponds precisely to the rst-order fragment which is invariant for generated submodels. We further establish that H(#; @) has (strong) interpolation, and provide failure results in the nite variable fragments. We also show that weak interpolation holds for the sublanguage H(@), and provide complexity results for H(@) and other fragments and variants (the full logic being undecidable).
Introduction
In their simplest form, hybrid languages are modal languages which use formulas to refer to worlds. To build a simple hybrid language, take an ordinary language of propositional modal logic (built over some collection of propositional variables p, q, r, and so on) and add a second type of atomic formula. These new atoms are called nominals, and are typically written i, j and k. Both types of atom can be freely combined to form more complex formulas in the usual way; for example,
3(i^p)^3(i^q) ! 3(p^q)
is a well formed formula. And now for the key idea: insist that each nominal must be true at exactly one world in any model. Thus a nominal names a world by being true there and nowhere else. This simple idea gives rise to richer logics (note, for example, that the previous formula is valid: if the antecedent is satis ed at a world m, then the unique world named by i must be accessible from m, and both p and q must be true there) and enables us to de ne classes of frames that ordinary modal languages cannot (we'll see some examples later).
Once the idea of using \formulas as terms" has been noted (Arthur Prior Pri67] , in uenced by unpublished work of C. A. Meredith, seems to have been the rst to grasp its potential) the way lies open for further enrichments. The most obvious is to regard nominals not as names but as variables over individual worlds, and to add quanti ers. That is, we now allow expressions like 8x:3(x^9y:3(y^3y)) to be formed. This sentence is satis ed at a world m if and only if from every world x that is accessible from m we can reach at least one re exive world y. No formula with this property exists in ordinary modal languages, or even in modal languages enriched with nominals. Unsurprisingly, if we are allowed to quantify over worlds in this manner, it is straightforward to de ne hybrid languages that o er rst-order expressivity over models. Early work on hybrid languages (notably that of Bull Bul70] and Passy and Tinchev PT85, PT91]) was largely concerned with such systems.
The idea of binding variables to worlds underlies much current work on hybrid languages, but for many purposes the 8 binder is arguably too strong: languages which employ 8 obscure the locality intuition central to Kripke semantics. Fundamental to Kripke semantics is the relativization of semantic evaluation to worlds. That is, to evaluate a modal formula we need to specify some world m (the current world) and begin evaluation there. The function of the modalities is to scan the worlds accessible from m, the worlds accessible from those worlds, and so on; in short, m is the starting point for step-wise local exploration of the model.
Languages which allow variables to be bound to arbitrary worlds (some of which may not be reachable from m by chaining through the accessibility relation) don't mesh well with this intuition. For this reason, recent work on hybrid languages has focussed on a local language called H(#; @). This extends the simplest type of hybrid language (propositional modal logic plus nominals) with two new mechanisms, # and @. Now # does bind variables to worlds, but (unlike 8) it does so in an intrinsically local way:
The # binder binds variables to the current world. In essence it enables us to create a name for the here-and-now.
The @ operator (which does not bind variables) is a natural counterpart to #. Whereas # \stores" the current world (by binding a variable to it), @ enables us to \retrieve" worlds.
More precisely, a formula of the form @ x ' is an instruction to move to the world labeled by the variable x and evaluate ' there. Previous work on H(#; @) has concentrated on relating it to other hybrid languages BS98], studying it axiomatically BT99], and developing analytic proof techniques Bla98, Tza98] . Taken together, this work suggests H(#; @) and certain of its sublanguages (notably H(@)) are important systems. The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate in detail that this impression is justi ed.
We do so as follows. After de ning H(#; @) and noting some basic results in Section 2, we turn in Section 3 to the task of characterizing its expressivity. The key result to emerge is this:
H(#; @) is not merely local, it is the language which characterizes locality. More precisely, H(#; @) corresponds to the fragment of rst-order logic which is invariant under generated submodels. Previous discussions of H(#; @) have stressed that it is \modally natural"; our characterization con rms this impression and makes it precise. In Section 4 we discuss the consequences of this characterization for frame-de nability, completeness, and tense logic. In
Section 5, we show that H(#; @) is well-behaved in yet another way: it has the strong (arrow) interpolation property, and the sublanguage H(@) has weak interpolation
In Section 6 we turn to complexity. It is known that H(#; @) has an undecidable satisfaction problem (indeed, this is clear from the characterization result); but it is also known that H(@) is decidable, that this sublanguage can de ne more classes of frames than ordinary propositional modal logic can, and that it is proof-theoretically well-behaved. Intriguingly, these properties come at no computational cost: we shall show that H(@) has a pspacecomplete satisfaction problem, just as ordinary propositional modal logic does. However we also show that there are limits on how far this result can be generalized: in particular we show that if we start with a language of tense logic, then adding even a single nominal moves the complexity of the local satisfaction problem from pspace to exptime. We close the paper with a discussion of a key open problem. The paper is largely self contained, but as the existing literature on hybrid languages is small and scattered it seems appropriate to give the reader a swift overview of what is available. First, two early papers on 8-based hybrid languages (namely Bul70] and PT91]) deserve to be far more widely read: both contain important technical ideas and interesting motivation for the use of hybrid languages. Second, some work has been done on very basic hybrid languages (that is, modal or tense languages enriched with nominals, but with no additional mechanisms such as #, @, or 8); the main references here are GG93] and Bla93]. Third, while BS98] and BT99] are the basic references for H(#; @), an interesting discussion of # as part of a stronger system can be found in Gor96] . Finally, in addition to the proof theoretical investigations of Bla98] and Tza98], there is also Sel91, Sel97]. Seligman's work deals with stronger (8-based) systems, but many of the key ideas underlying hybrid deduction (in particular, the deductive signi cance of @) were rst explored here, and they are still the only source we know of for discussion of natural deduction techniques for hybrid logics.
Preliminaries
In this section we de ne the syntax and semantics of H(#; @) and note some of its basic properties.
De nition 2.1 (Language) Let PROP = fp 1 ; p 2 ; : : :g be a countable set of propositional variables, NOM = fi 1 ; i 2 ; : : :g a countable set of nominals, and WVAR = fx 1 ; x 2 ; : : :g a countable set of world variables. We assume that PROP, NOM and WVAR are pairwise disjoint. We call WSYM = NOM WVAR the set of world symbols, and ATOM = PROP NOM WVAR the set of atoms. The well-formed formulas of the hybrid language (over the signature hPROP; NOM; WVAR i) are ' := > j ? j a j :' j '^' 0 j 2' j #x j :' j @ s ' where a 2 ATOM, x j 2 WVAR and s 2 WSYM. Let L be the set of all well-formed formulas. For ' 2 L, PROP('), NOM(') and WVAR(') denote, respectively, the set of propositional variables, nominals, and world variables which occur in '. IP(') will denote PROP(') NOM('), and will be called the language of '. In what follows we assume that a signature hPROP; NOM; WVARi, and hence L, has been xed. We usually write p, q and r for propositional variables, i, j and k for nominals, and x, y and z for world variables. As usual, 3' is de ned to be :2:'
Note that all three types of atomic symbol are formulas. Further, note that the above syntax is simply that of ordinary unimodal propositional modal logic extended by the clauses for # x j :' and @ s '. Finally, the di erence between nominals and world variables is simply this: nominals cannot be bound by #, whereas world variables can. In fact, nominals could be dispensed with (it is always possible to make do with free world variables instead) but for some purposes it is useful to have a special kind of world symbol that can't be accidentally bound.
De nition 2.2 The notions of free and bound world variable are de ned in the manner familiar from rst-order logic, with # as the only binding operator. Similarly, other syntactic notions (such as substitution, and of a world symbol t being substitutable for x in ') are de ned as the corresponding notions in rst-order logic. We use ' t=s] to denote the formula obtained by replacing all free instances of the world symbol t by the world symbol s.
A sentence is a formula containing no free world variables. Furthermore, a formula is pure if it contains no propositional variables, and nominal-free if it contains no nominals. When M and g are understood by context we will simply write m ' for M; g; m '. We write M; g ' i for all m 2 M, M; g; m '. We write M j = ' i for all g, M; g '.
The rst six clauses are essentially the standard Kripke forcing relation for propositional modal logic; in fact the only di erence is that whereas the standard de nition relativizes semantic evaluation to worlds m, we relativize to variable assignments g as well. Note that the clause for atoms covers all three types of symbol (propositional variables, nominals, and world variables) and that given any model M and assignment g, any world symbol (whether it is a nominal or a world variable) will be forced at a unique world; this is an immediate consequence of the way we de ned valuations and assignments. As promised in the introduction, # binds world variables to the world where evaluation is being performed (the current world), and @ s shifts evaluation to the world named by s. Just Until('; ) := #x:3 #y:@ x (3(y^')^2(3y ! )): Note how this works: we name the current world x, use 3 to move to an accessible world, which we name y, and then use @ to jump us back to x. We then use the modalities to insist that (1) ' holds at the world named y, and (2) holds at all successors of the current world that precede this y-labeled world.
But there is an obvious (and modally natural) limit to the expressive power H(#; @) gives us: any nominal-free sentence is preserved under the formation of point-generated (or rooted) submodels. That is, if a sentence ' is satis ed at a world m in a model M, and we form a submodel M m by discarding from M all the worlds that are not reachable by making a nite (possibly empty) sequence of transitions from m, then M m also satis es ' at m. ( The key point to observe is that in any subformula of ' of the form @ t , t must be a world variable bound by some previous occurrence of #. As # binds to the current world, t is bound to some world in the submodel generated by m, thus ' is una ected by the restriction to M m .) That is, H(#; @) is genuinely local: only reachable worlds are relevant to semantic evaluation. In the following section we shall generalize this observation (we have not merely preservation, but invariance) and show that it characterizes the expressivity of H(#; @).
H(#; @) also o ers us considerable expressive power with respect to frames. Modal logicians like to view modal languages as tools for talking about frames, and they do so via the concept of frame validity:
De nition 2. But we are interested in this axiomatization for another reason. The completeness result proved in BT99] is very general: not only does this axiomatization generate all valid formulas, but it automatically extends to many stronger logics. In particular, if we add a pure, nominalfree, sentence ' as an additional axiom, the resulting system is strongly complete with respect to the class of frames that ' de nes. In Section 4 we shall characterize the completeness results covered by such extensions.
Before starting our investigations, one nal remark. We have de ned H(#; @) to be an extension of unimodal propositional modal logic. But of course, it would have been equally straightforward to extend a multimodal language (that is, a language containing an indexed collection of modalities, each interpreted by a separate relation) or a language of tense logic (that is, propositional modal logic enriched with modalities which scan the converse of the relation R) with nominals, variables, @ and # in exactly the same way. For the most part we will work with the above version of H(#; @) (most results go through for other formulations essentially unchanged) but sometimes it will be interesting to switch to a richer underlying modal language, especially when we discuss computational complexity in Section 6.
3 Characterizing H(#; @) In this section we characterize (the rst-order language corresponding to) H(#; @). We begin by providing a syntactic characterization. In particular, we shall rst extend the standard translation ST of modal logic into rst-order logic (cf. Ben83]) to H(#; @). It will be clear that the range of our translation lies in a certain bounded fragment, and we shall de ne a reverse translation HT which maps the bounded fragment back into the the hybrid language.
Thus we are free to think either in terms of H(#; @) or the corresponding bounded fragment.
But how are these languages characterized semantically? It should be clear that H(#; @)
is a genuine hybrid of modal and rst-order ideas (after all, it combines Kripke semantics with the idea of binding variables to worlds) thus there are two obvious ways to proceed. The rst is essentially rst-order: we could look for a weaker notion of Ehrenfeucht-Fra ss e game. The second is essentially modal: we could try looking for a stronger notion of bisimulation. We shall pursue both options. As we shall see, both yield natural notions of equivalence between models, and by relating them (and drawing on our syntactic characterization) we can provide a detailed picture of what H(#; @) o ers.
Translations
We focus on two kinds of signature for rst-order logic with equality. First we have modal signatures (familiar from modal correspondence theory Ben83]) which consist of one binary predicate R, countably many unary predicates, and no constant symbols. It will be convenient to make the set of rst-order variables at our disposal explicit in the signature ST x (#x j :') = 9x j :(x = x j^S T x (')). ST x (@ s ') = ST s ('), s 2 NOM VAR. Now the BS98] translation makes the quanti cational e ect of # clear, but our translation draws attention to another perspective: in adding # and @ we have in e ect enriched the modal language with an explicit substitution operator. Such operators are used in the study of cylindric algebras, and were added to cylindric modal logic in Ven94].
The link between #and explicit substitution can be made even more clear if we expand the rst-order language with an explicit substitution operator (like s i j in the theory of cylindric algebras) and adjust our de nition of ST to take advantage of it. We do this as follows. Add the following clause to the grammar generating the rst-order language:
if ' is a formula and x; y are variables, then S x y ' is a formula. Interpret S x y as follows: The side-condition on the generation of existentially quanti ed formulas is crucial: it prevents sentences like 9x:(Rxx^x = x) from falling into the fragment. The sentence 9x:Rxx is probably the simplest example of a rst-order sentence which is not invariant for generated submodels (or subframes). In fact it is not even preserved under the formation of generated submodels, for it is true in the model M 1 but not in the generated submodel M 2 :
Clearly ST generates formulas in the bounded fragment. Crucially, however, we can also translate the bounded fragment into H(#; @). The translation HT from the bounded fragment over hfRg UN-REL; CONS; VARi into the hybrid language over hUN-REL; CONS; VARi is de ned as follows:
HT(Rtt 0 ) = @ t 3t 0 . HT(P j t) = @ t p j . HT(t = t 0 ) = @ t t 0 . HT(:') = :HT(').
HT(9v:(Rtv^')) = @ t 3 #v:HT(').
(Here t; t 0 2 VAR CONS.)
By construction, HT(') is a hybrid formula, but furthermore it is a boolean combination of @-formulas (formulas whose main operator is @). So, because @ commutes with all the booleans (recall the Self Dual @ axiom and Proposition 2.6), it is equivalent to a formula whose main operator is @. We can now prove the following strong truth preservation result. Recall i. ' is equivalent to the standard translation of a hybrid formula. ii. ' is equivalent to a formula in the bounded fragment.
Moreover, there are e ective translations between H(#; @) and the bounded fragment.
Generated back-and-forth systems
We now turn to the problem of providing semantic characterizations of H(#; @) (or equivalently, of the bounded fragment). In this section we shall adopt an essentially rst-order approach: we de ne generated back-and-forth systems, basically a restricted form of EhrenfeuchtFra ss e game, and link it to the concept of generated submodels. Generated back-and-forth systems Let M and N be two rst-order models in the hybrid signature. A generated back-and-forth system between M and N is a non-empty family F of nite partial isomorphisms between M and N satisfying the following two extension rules:
(3-extension) -(forth) if h 2 F, x in its domain and R M xy, then h fhy; y 0 ig 2 F for some y 0 2 N.
-(back) if h 2 F, x in its range and R N xy, then h fhy 0 ; yig 2 F for some y 0 2 M. (nominal extension) -(forth) if h 2 F and there exists an x 2 M such that V M (i) = fxg for some nominal i, then there exists an x 0 2 N such that h fhx; x 0 ig 2 F.
-(back) a similar condition backwards.
Let m 2 M and n 2 N. Then (M; m) R (N; n) means that there exists a generated backand-forth system between M and N which connects m and n. More generally, let m ( n) be a nite M-tuple (N-tuple). Then (M; m) R (N; n) means that there exists a generated back-and-forth system between M and N, containing a partial isomorphism which sends m(i) to n(i).
Note how closely this de nition follows the familiar one from rst-order logic (cf. e.g., Hod93]).
In fact, if we think of such a system as describing an Ehrenfeucht-Fra ss e game, then the sole di erence is that in the \generated back-and-forth game" the universal player (8belard) must choose his moves from R-successors or worlds named by a nominal, whereas he can play whatever he likes in the full rst-order game. Unsurprisingly, restricting the play to accessible worlds means that generated back-and-forth systems and generated submodels are closely connected.
De nition 3.6 (Generated Submodel) Let M = hM; R; V i be a hybrid model and S M. Let NOM denote the subset of M whose elements are in the interpretation of some nominal. The submodel of M generated by S is the substructure of M with domain fm 2 M j 9s 2 S NOM(R sm)g (R is the re exive and transitive closure of R). This is also called the S-generated submodel of M.
Note that if NOM = ;, we obtain the familiar modal notion of a generated submodel; and that if in addition S is a singleton set, we have the usual modal notion of a point-generated In a similar spirit, we shall say that a rst-order formula '( x) in the same signature is invariant for generated back-and-forth systems if for all models (M; m) and (N; n), (M; m) R (N; n) Theorem 3.7 Let '( x) be a rst-order formula in the hybrid signature. Then the following are equivalent.
i. '( x) is equivalent to a formula in the bounded fragment.
ii. '( x) is invariant for generated submodels.
iii. '( x) is invariant for generated back-and-forth systems.
Proof.
i. ) ii. is obvious.
ii. ) iii. First note that '( x) is invariant for generated submodels if and only if :'( x) is. Now suppose '( x) is invariant for generated submodels but not preserved under generated back-and-forth systems. Then we have models (M; m) and (N; n), a generated back-and-forth system linking m and n, and M j = '( m) while N j = :'( n). 9loise has a winning strategy in all games where 8belard only plays immediate R-successors or points named by a nominal. But since the models are generated, in the rst-order backand-forth game he can only play worlds which are accessible by a nite R-transition from either the root or one of the named worlds. But then she can compute a winning answer for the classic Ehrenfeucht-Fra ss e from her winning generated back-and-forth strategy. This contradicts the claim that M 0 j = '( m) and N 0 j = :'( n). iii. ) i. We use a van Benthem style diagram-chasing argument Ben96]. We only provide the outline. Let '( x) be as in the hypothesis and BC('( x)) the bounded consequences of '( x) (that is, the consequences of '( x) that belong to the bounded fragment). We will show that BC('( x)) j = '( x), from which the result follows by compactness. 
Hybrid bisimulations
We have just seen that by weakening the notion of an Ehrenfeucht-Fra ss e game we can link the bounded fragment (and hence H(#; @)) with generated submodels. But in spite of its binding apparatus, H(#; @) has a distinctly modal avor. Is it not also possible to strengthen the notion of bisimulation (the standard notion of equivalence between models used in modal logic) with clauses for # and @, and so characterize H(#; @) in intrinsically modal terms?
That's what we will do in this section. The approach has an advantage over the use of generated back-and-forth systems: preservation results can be easily obtained for reducts as well.
Recall that for ordinary propositional modal logics, bisimulations are non-empty binary relations linking the domains of models, with the restriction that only worlds with identical atomic information and matching accessibility relations should be connected (see De nition 3.7 Ben83]; here bisimulations are called p-relations). Now, if we want to extend this notion to H(#; @), we need to take care of assignments to world variables as well. To this end, hybrid bisimulations will not simply link worlds, rather they will link pairs ( m; m), where m is a world and m is an assignment. We start by de ning k-bisimulations, which are the correct notion of bisimulation for formulas ' such that WVAR(') fx 1 ; : : : ; x k g. (#) If ( m; m) k ( n; n), then for every j k, ( m j m ; m) k ( n j n ; n).
Note that since # and @ are self-dual, we can collapse the back and forth clauses for these modalities into one. We write M k N if there exists a k-bisimulation between the two models.
To extend the notion to the full language we need to add only one further condition. !-bisimulation. Let M and N be two hybrid models. An !-bisimulation between M and N is a non-empty family of k-bisimulations satisfying the following storage rule:
(sto) If ( m; m) k ( n; n), then ( m m; m) k+1 ( n n; n). Some remarks. First, k and !-bisimulations can be restricted to a given set of propositional variables and nominals PROP NOM by restricting (prop) and (@) accordingly. Second, the modular de nition of k and !-bisimulation will lead to results for reducts of the language as well. For instance if we delete # from the language, we just delete the (#) clause from the de nition of bisimulation and we obtain the appropriate notion for H(@). Of course, if we delete the variables from the language, we don't need the assignment tuples anymore, and the bisimulation becomes just a relation between worlds, as usual. Preservation results for all these alternatives can be given (the required proofs follow much the same lines as the proofs below) and we shall prove one such result in Section 7.
The rst important fact about hybrid bisimulations is that they preserve truth: Thus there is a clear link between our earlier work on generated back-and-forth systems, and the next theorem shouldn't come as a surprise: It is possible to prove a direct characterization result for H(#; @) in terms of invariance for k-bisimulations, using again a diagram chasing argument. We're not going to do this here since in the next section we shall take a detour via the bounded fragment to reach the same result. It is also possible to develop k-pebble versions of generated back-and-forth systems; this notion takes the exact number of variables used in formulas into account. It is not di cult to see that k + 1-pebble generated back-and-forth systems correspond to k-bisimulations, but we won't follow up these matters here.
Harvest
It is time to draw together the threads developed in the previous section. First we note their consequences for H(#; @) expressivity over models. Then we note the consequences for frames and what this tells us about hybrid completeness. Finally we note the consequences for hybrid tense logic.
Expressivity over models
We have the following ve-fold characterization of H(#; @): Theorem 4.1 Let '( x) be a rst-order formula in the hybrid signature (with equality). Then the following are equivalent.
i. '( x) is equivalent to the standard translation of a H(#; @) formula.
ii. '( x) is invariant for generated submodels. iii. '( x) is invariant for generated back-and-forth systems. iv. '( x) is invariant for !-bisimulation. v. '( x) is equivalent to a formula in the bounded fragment of rst-order logic.
Proof. By Corollary 3.4, Theorem 3.7 and Proposition 3.8. But these have obvious consequences for the ordinary modal correspondence language. In particular, if we consider nominal-free hybrid sentences, then we obtain a ve-fold characterization of the fragment of rst-order logic in the classical modal signature which is invariant for generated submodels: Corollary 4.2 Let '(x) be a rst-order formula in the modal signature with equality. Then the following are equivalent.
i. '(x) is equivalent to the standard translation of a nominal-free H(#; @) sentence.
ii. '(x) is invariant for generated submodels (now in the standard modal sense). iii. '(x) is invariant for R-generated back-and-forth systems, where an R-generated backand-forth system is a back-and-forth system satisfying only the 3-extension rule.
iv. '(x) is invariant for !-bisimulation. v. '(x) is equivalent to a formula in the bounded fragment of rst-order logic without constants.
Frames and completeness
Recall that a frame F is a pair hW; Ri (that is, a model without a valuation). Since the late 1950s, one of the central topics in modal logic has been linking modal formulas to properties of frames and investigating when they give rise to complete axiomatizations for the frame classes they de ne. The work of the previous section easily yields a characterization of the framede ning abilities of pure nominal-free sentences. Moreover, the axiomatic investigations of BT99] (and indeed, the tableaux-based investigations of Bla98]) show that there is a perfect match between de nability and completeness for pure nominal-free sentences. By combining these results we obtain matching de nability and completeness results for a wide range of rst-order de nable frame classes. In modal correspondence theory, the rst-order language (with equality) over the signature consisting simply of a binary symbol R is called the ( rst-order) frame language. We shall call a formula ' in the frame language containing exactly one free variable a frame condition. The class of frames de ned by a frame condition '(x) is the class in which the universal closure 8x'(x) is true; we call this class frames(8x:'(x)).
Before proceeding further, two simple observations are in order. First, note that if we apply the standard translation ST to a pure nominal-free sentence , then ST( ) is a frame condition with free-variable x. Furthermore, note that for any frame F = hW; Ri we have that ii. If '(x) is not in the bounded fragment, there is a pure nominal free sentence such that de nes frames(8x:'(x)), and ST( ) is equivalent to '(x). Moreover, K H(#; @)]+ is strongly complete with respect to frames(8x:'(x)).
Conversely, if is pure nominal-free sentence, then de nes frames(8x:ST ( (x))), and K H(#; @)] + is complete with respect to frames(8x:ST ( (x))).
Proof. The converse condition was proved in BT98], so let's examine the other direction.
For item i., we rst remark that as '(x) belongs to the frame language, it contains no unary predicate symbols, hence HT('(x)) is a pure formula; that # For item ii., we know that '(x) being invariant under generated submodels is equivalent to a formula in the bounded fragment | but is it equivalent to a frame condition ' 0 (x)? In fact, this can be established by modifying the diagram chasing argument used in the proof of Theorem 3.7. The key point to observe is that instead of showing that BC('(x)) j = '(x), we can show by the same method that FC('(x)) j = '(x), where FC are all the frame conditions implied by '(x). Thus there is an equivalent frame condition ' 0 (x), and we can take to be #x:HT(' 0 (x)). The remainder of the proof is as for item i. 
Hybrid tense logic
The characterization results have a particularly natural interpretation in the setting of hybrid tense logic. Recall that in tense logic we write 2 as G, 3 as F, and that we also have at our disposal an operator H (a 2-operator that scans the converse of the accessibility relation) and its dual P (a 3-operator that scans the converse of the accessibility relation). It is straightforward to hybridize tense logic by adding nominals, @ and # (though now it is more natural to talk of time variables rather than world variables) thus forming the language H t (#; @). To cope with the backward looking operators, tense logic requires a slightly more liberal notion of generated submodel: a point t belongs to the submodel temporally generated by a subset S if t is reachable from some point s 2 S by making a nite sequence of moves through the accessibility relation, where both forward and backward steps are allowed. The characterization results we have proved hold for H t (#; @) under this notion of generated submodel. But let's press matters a little further. Note that in nominal-free sentences of H t (#; @), all occurrences of @ are eliminable. As a simple example, consider the de nition of the Until operator:
Until('; ) := #x:F #y:@ x (F(y^')^G(Fy ! )):
(This is simply the de nition given in Section 2 written in tense logical notation.) But observe that the following nominal-free sentence has the same e ect:
Until('; ) := #x:F #y:P(x^(F(y^')^G(Fy ! ))):
That is, instead of retrieving the point named x using the @ operator, we can \reach back" for this point using P.
This observation ( rst made in BS98]) is completely general. As long as a H t (#; @) formula doesn't contain nominals or free time variables, it will always be possible to simulate @ by zig-zagging back to the binding point using the tense operators. More precisely, suppose a nominal free sentence ' has a temporal depth of n (that is, the maximal depth of embedding of tense operators is n) and that ' is satis ed at a time m. Then when we evaluate a subformula of ' of the form @ x at some point m 0 (note that m 0 cannot be more than n forward and back steps from m) then we know that x must bound to a point m 00 (which is also not more than n forward and back steps from m). Hence m 0 and m 00 are separated by at most 2n (forward and back) steps. We can de ne an operator @ 2n that allows us to zig-zag to a named time lying within 2n steps as follows. Let zz2n be the set of all non-empty nite sequences of F and P operators of length at most 2n. Then for any formula and any variable x we de ne:
Hence, given a nominal free sentence ' of temporal depth n, we eliminate all occurrences of @ as follows. Let @ x be a subformula of ' where contains no occurrences of @. Replace @ x by @ 2n x to form ' 0 . Repeating this procedure (starting with ' 0 ) produces an equivalent nominal-free sentence containing no occurrences of @. Thus, in the setting of tense logic, our characterization results for nominal free sentences go through without the help of @.
This is a pleasing result, for there are also non-technical reasons for viewing H t (#) as a key system: this language can be viewed as a marriage between the ideas of Arthur Prior and Hans Reichenbach.
That H t (#) captures the idea of Arthur Prior is clear: tense logic was invented by Prior
precisely to capture the \internal" perspective on time which underlies temporal discourse in natural language (see in particular Pri67]). But while the Priorean perspective gets a lot right, it misses a crucial fact about temporal discourse: tenses are very often referential. That is, tenses in natural language often achieve their e ect by referring to speci c points of time, and many semantic distinctions between natural language tenses cannot be drawn without taking referential e ects into account. The importance of temporal reference was rst made clear in the work of Hans Reichenbach, and many modern theories of tense (for example, Com85]) adopt a fundamentally Reichenbachian stance.
It should be clear where this is heading: # can be seen as the Reichenbachian device par excellence. In a sense, # gives us a sort of generalized present tense; it enables us to \store" an evaluation point, thereby making it possible to insist later that certain events happened at that time, or that certain other events must be viewed from that particular perspective. This is precisely the kind of expressive power we need to encode Reichenbach's ideas. And crucially, the use of # does not in any sense con ict with Prior's use of tense operators. Quite the reverse: F, P, and # work together beautifully. No auxiliary apparatus (not even @) is required to blend the two approaches, and the result is a language which exactly captures rst-order temporal reachability.
Interpolation
In this section we show that H(#; @) is well behaved in yet another sense: it has the interpolation property. Interpolation is a much studied notion. Originally considered a property of deductive systems, it was proved for rst-order logic in Cra57] using a proof theoretic argument. We shall view interpolation as a property of consequence relations and will prove it using semantic arguments (as is done, for example, in CK90]). 1 Before plunging into the details, note that in modal logic we can distinguish between strong arrow interpolation (AIP) and weak turnstile interpolation (TIP). AIP implies TIP, but not conversely. We will prove AIP for H(#; @), disprove AIP and TIP for its nite variable fragments (our earlier work on k-bisimulations will enable us to construct counterexamples fairly straightforwardly) and show that TIP interpolation holds for the sublanguage H(@). For rst-order logic these notions are equivalent, but in modal logic this is not the case (as we see below, equivalence depends on both compactness and the availability of a deduction theorem; cf. also Cze82]). Further, note that the meaning of TIP depends on the way we de ne the consequence relation ' j = . In Section 2 we introduced two consequence relations: For this reason, from now on we take TIP to be de ned using the global consequence relation. AIP and TIP are often referred to as the strong and weak interpolation properties respectively, and we shall sometimes use this terminology. We turn to the technicalities of the interpolation result. As is usual in interpolation proofs, where language related issues require special care, we replace the standard notion of consistency De nition 5.2 (Consistency) Let T be a set of formulas in L. Then T is consistent i there is a model M, an m 2 M, and an assignment g such that for all ' 2 T, M; g; m '.
by the ner-grained notion of separability De nition 5.3 (Separability) Let T; U; L be sets of formulas in L. We say that the pair hT; Ui is separable with respect to L if there exists a formula 2 L such that T j = and U j = : . hT; Ui is inseparable with respect to L if it is not separable with respect to L.
We are ready to prove the main result of this section. Proof. Suppose we are given formulas ' 0 and 0 such that there is no interpolant for ' 0 ! 0 . We will prove that 6 j = ' 0 ! 0 by producing a model M = hM; R; V i and an assignment g such that for some m 2 M, M; g; m ' 0^: 0 (the proof follows the method of CK90] in which two connected models are simultaneously built using fresh constants). Hence we will have shown the contrapositive.
We can assume that f' 0 g and f: 0 g are consistent (for if they are not, then either ? or > is an interpolant). If T j f' j g and U j are separable over L 0 ' 0 0 then T j+1 = T j , else { if ' j 6 = @ s s and ' j 6 = @ s 3' 0 for s 2 WSYM, then T j+1 = T j f' j g, { if ' j = @ s s, then T j+1 = T j f' j g f@ s (n k^s )g, for n k 2 NnNOM(T j U j ), { if ' j = @ s 3' 0 , then T j+1 = T j f' j g f@ s 3(n k^' 0 )g, for n k 2 NnNOM(T j U j f' j g). If T j+1 and U j f j g are separable over L 0 ' 0 0 then U j+1 = U j , else { if j 6 = @ s s and j 6 = @ s 3 0 for s 2 WSYM, then U j+1 = U j f j g, { if j = @ s s, then U j+1 = U j f j g f@ s (n k^s )g, for n k 2 NnNOM(T j+1 U j ), { if j = @ s 3 0 , then T j+1 = T j f j g f@ s 3(n k^ 0 )g, for n k 2 NnNOM(T j+1 U j f j g).
The fresh nominals play the same role as Henkin witnesses in rst-order proofs: they ensure that we obtain models in which every world has a name. Contradiction.
By using the inductive hypothesis \hT j ; U j i is an inseparable pair" and going step by step through the construction, the inseparability of hT j+1 ; U j+1 i is easily established. J Since the two models share the same frame, and agree on the common language, there is a model M for the union of the two languages which has M ' 0 and M 0 as reducts. But then by (1), M; g; n 0 ' 0^: 0 , and we have proved the contrapositive. We now rename again the formulas to the original x; y; z and the interpolant will only contain free world variables common to ' 0 and 0 .
Furthermore, note that nothing in the proof is intrinsically tied to the number of modalities in the language. In other words, arrow interpolation also holds for the multi-modal versions of H(#; @) if modalities are allowed freely in the interpolant. Corollary 5.5 Multi-modal H(#; @) has arrow interpolation if no restriction on occurrences of modalities is imposed for the interpolant.
However when we restrict the interpolant to contain only the modalities in the common language, then interpolation does not follows immediately, especially if the modalities interact (for example, if the theory contains axioms involving more than one modality; see Mar99] for examples of this type). Nonetheless, we advance the following conjecture:
Conjecture 5.6 Multi-modal H(#; @) has arrow interpolation even if the interpolant's modalities are restricted to the common language.
On the other hand, it is clear from the proof that the number of world variables needed cannot be bounded (they are used to quantify away the nominals in the proof of Claim 1). Indeed, if we restrict H(#; @) to only a nite number of variables, then arrow interpolation fails.
Because we have the notion of a k-bisimulations at our disposal, it is fairly straightforward to Finally, ' is true in M; a, while is false at N; a 0 which proves that an interpolant on only one variable does not exist 2 . Actually, not even an interpolant in two variables exists as also a 2-bisimulation between M and N can be de ned.
Notice that the heart of the counterexample is just a counting argument, which can be reproduced for the other nite variable fragments of H(#; @) by taking bigger and bigger models M and N exhibiting the same basic pattern. Hence:
Theorem 5.7 Strong interpolation (AIP) fails in all nite world variable fragments of H(#; @).
2
The formulas ' = 3p^3:p and = 3i ! 3:i provide a simpler counterexample to strong interpolation in the one-variable fragment, but they have 3>^(3x ! 3:x) as weak interpolant. The more complex example proves failure in the weak case also.
A more complex counterexample based on the same idea can be set up to prove failure of Then as ' j = glo , is globally true at M ! . We need something stronger than a mere 1-bisimulations linking M ! and N ! , as we want to transfer global truth. With ordinary modal languages, requiring to be total and surjective is enough, but we have to take care of assignments as well. We shall say that a k-bisimulation ii. IP( ) IP(') \ IP( ). Outline of Proof. We outline how the proof of arrow interpolation for H(#; @) should be modi ed to obtain the result.
First, the construction of the pasted sets T ! and U ! needs to be adjusted as we need to ensure that the labeled models obtained from them make ' 0 and : 0 globally true. To that end, whenever we run into a formula of the form @ s s or @ s 3 we paste not only a new nominal n k but also the formulas we want to make globally true. For example one clause in the de nition of T j+1 would read { if ' j = @ s s, then T j+1 = T j f' j g f@ s (n k^s^'0 )g, for n k 2 NnNOM(T j U j ).
We will need to show that for all j 2 !, hT j ; U j i is (globally) inseparable with respect to L 0 ' 0 0 . The base case is simple: if (including perhaps some new nominals fn i i ; : : : ; n i k g) separates hT 0 ; U 0 i on L 0 ' 0 0 , then x i 1 : : : x i k ] separates hf' 0 g; f: 0 gi, for new variables fx i i ; : : : ; x i k g; this is precisely where the free variables in the interpolant are needed.
What about the inductive step? Consider, for example, the case of ' j = @ s s. Assume that hT j f' j g; U j i is inseparable in L 0 ' 0 0 ; we want to prove that hT j f' j ; @ s (n k^s^'0 )g; U j i is inseparable. Suppose separates this last pair. Then U j j = glo : while T j f@ s s; @ s (n kŝ^' 0 )g j = glo . Because @ s (n k^s^'0 ) is an @-formula, this is the case i T j f@ s sg j = glo @ s (n k^s^'0 ) ! . Furthermore, as ' 0 2 T j and n k is a new nominal by de nition, for all M, M j = T j implies M j = @ s (n k^s^'0 ). Hence T j f@ s sg j = glo . Contradiction.
From now on the proof follows the same lines as before. We obtain labeled models such that M ' 0 j = ' 0 and M 0 j = : 0 \sharing" the same frame, from which we build a model M where ' 0^: 0 holds globally. A careful analysis of weaker versions of the Beth property can be carried out for fragments of H(#; @) as we did with the interpolation property.
Complexity
Beautiful as H(#; @) is, it has a drawback: its satisfaction problem is undecidable (see BS95]). The culprit is the binder #; @ is not needed. However H(#; @) has an interesting sublanguage, namely H(@). As we have just seen, although H(@) does not enjoy strong interpolation, it does have weak interpolation. Moreover, as is shown in Bla98], simple tableaux and sequent systems for H(@) can be de ned by exploiting the interplay between nominals (or free variables) and @; the underlying idea traces back to Sel91]. Furthermore, while H(@) doesn't o er any exciting new expressivity at the level of models (for example, without the # binder we can't de ne Until) it does provide new expressivity at the level of frames: we can de ne many properties that are not de nable in ordinary propositional modal logic, including irre exivity (@ i 2:i), asymmetry (@ i 3j ! @ j :3i) and antisymmetry (@ i 3j^@ j 3i ! @ i j); these correspondences are easy to check using the standard translation. Moreover, pure formulas such as these automatically yield complete axiomatizations for the frame classes they de ne (see BT99, Bla98] ).
Thus there are many reasons for being interested in H(@), and a natural question to ask is: how high a computational price do we pay for these bene ts? It turns out that (up to a polynomial) there are no extra computational costs when expanding unimodal logic (or even multimodal logic) with @ and nominals and/or free variables, but expanding tense logic with even a single nominal (or free variable) leads to an increase in complexity (assuming pspace 6 = exptime).
For the most part we will study (local) K-satisfaction problems: given a formula ', does there exist a model M, a world m and an assignment g, such that M; g; m '? (The K re ects the fact that we place no restrictions on the satisfying models; thus in e ect we're measuring the complexity of the minimal logic K in whatever language we're working with.)
Note that as far as local satisfaction problems are concerned, if we replace all variables in ' by nominals, obtaining ' 0 , then ' is satis able if and only if ' 0 is satis able. For this reason we can restrict ourselves in the proofs to formulas without variables, and we won't need to mention variable assignments. However at the end of this section we examine the complexity of the global K-satisfaction problem and an interesting di erence between nominals and world variables emerges.
We will consider expansions with @ and nominals of the following modal languages:
1. the unimodal language; that is, the language with one operator 2 and its dual 3;
2. the basic tense language; that is, the language with two operators G and H and their respective duals F and P, where the accessibility relation for H and P is the converse of the relation for G and F;
3. their multimodal versions: frames come with a family of accessibility relations fR i g i2I , each has its own forward looking modality i] and dual hii, and in the tense case, also their backward looking counterparts i]^and hii^.
The complexity of the K-satisfaction problem for all these modal languages is known:
Theorem 6.1 i. Lad77] The K-satisfaction problem in the unimodal language is pspace-hard.
ii. Spa93b] The K-satisfaction problem for the tensed multimodal languages is in pspace.
That is, for ordinary modal languages the additional expressive power obtained by adding a backwards looking operator does not lead to an increase in complexity, and neither does the addition of more modalities, including multiple backwards looking operators. However if we hybridize these languages, the situation is rather di erent. For a start, adding even just one nominal to tense logic causes a jump in complexity from pspace to exptime:
Theorem 6.2 The K-satisfaction problem for a basic tense language containing at least one nominal is exptime-hard.
Proof. We shall reduce the exptime-complete global K-satisfaction problem for unimodal languages to the (local) K-satisfaction problem for a basic tense language that contains at least one nominal. We obtain the corresponding upper bound by translating into rst-order logic. It turns out that we end up in (a version of) the guarded fragment with two variables (see AvBN98] ). The satisfaction problem of this fragment is known to be exptime-complete, whence the desired result.
In fact we will prove a stronger result. The universal modality E is a modality with the following interpretation: in any model M, at any m 2 M, M; m E' i for some m 0 2 M, M; m 0 '. (That is, with the aid of the universal modality we can scan the entire model for information.) The universal modality is very strong (see GP92] for a detailed discussion) but for present purposes we need merely observe that, given E, we can de ne @ i ' to be E(i^').
In spite of its strength, we have the following upper bound: Theorem 6.3 The K-satisfaction problem for a multimodal tense language expanded with both nominals and the universal modality is exptime-complete. Summing up: the addition of even one nominal to a basic tense language yields an exptimehard local K-satisfaction problem. However, adding further nominals, multiple forwards and backwards looking modalities, and even the universal modality, doesn't take us any higher in the complexity hierarchy.
This completes our complexity analysis of tense languages, so let's turn to a positive result:
(multimodal) H(@) has the same complexity as ordinary propositional modal logic. Theorem 6.4 The K-satisfaction problem of multimodal language enriched with nominals and @ is pspace-complete.
Proof. The lower bound follows from Fact 6.1. We show the upper bound by de ning the notion of a -game between two players. We will show that the existential player has a winning strategy for the -game if and only if is satis able. Moreover every -game stops after at most as many rounds as the modal depth of and the information on the playing board is polynomial in the length of . Using the close correspondence between Alternating Turing Machines (ATM's) and two player games Chl86], it is straightforward to implement the problem of whether the existential player has a winning strategy in the -game on a ptime ATM. Because any ptime ATM algorithm can be turned into a pspace Turing Machine program, we obtain our desired result. We present the proof only for unimodal H(@); it can be straightforwardly extended to the multimodal case. Fix a formula . A -HS (for Hintikka Set) is a maximal consistent set of subformulas of . We denote the set of subformulas of by SF ( ). The -game is played as follows. There are M 0 consists of her initial move fX 0 ; : : : ; X n g. Suppose M j is de ned. Then M j+1 consists of a copy of those Hintikka Sets she plays when using her winning strategy for each of 8belard's possible moves played in the Hintikka Sets from M j (except when she plays a HS from her initial move, then of course we do not make a copy). Let M be the disjoint union of all M j for j smaller than the modal depth of . Set Rmm 0 i for all 3' 2 SF( ), 3' 6 2 m ) ' 6 2 m 0 holds, and set V (p) = fm 2 M j p 2 mg. Note that the rules of the game guarantee that nominals are interpreted as singletons.
We claim that the following truth-lemma holds. In particular, note that ' j = glo i j = A' ! , where A is the dual of E.
But this is not the end of the matter: what if we were to extend the unimodal language with variables instead of nominals? This does make a di erence. Recall from Section 2 that M j = ' is de ned to hold i for all g, M; g '. That is, g is not held constant. Now, if there are no world variables in ', g is irrelevant and (as we have just observed) global satisfaction is exptime-complete. But if ' is allowed to contain free variables, the implicit universal quanti cation in the de nition certainly does change matters. In e ect, we are surreptitiously using the global hybrid binder 8 mentioned in the introduction, and we wind up with an undecidable global satisfaction problem.
This can be shown as follows. Let ' be the formula (3x 1^3 x 2^3 x 3 ) ! 2(x 1 $ x 2 _ x 1 $ x 3 _ x 2 $ x 3 ). Then for every model M = hM; R; V i, M j = ' if and only if M j = 8yx 1 x 2 x 3 :((Ryx 1^R yx 2^R yx 3 ) ! (x 1 = x 2 _ x 1 = x 3 _ x 2 = x 3 )). In other words ' expresses that every world has at most two R-successors. Similarly we can create a formula without propositional variables expressing that every world has at most three two-step Rsuccessors. But in Spa93b] it is shown that the global satisfaction problem of the uni-modal logic of the class of frames satisfying these two conditions is undecidable (see the proof of Theorem 4.2.1 and its preliminaries). Note that this argument makes no use of @.
Pressing this line of thought further, we can show that if we have at least three modalities in the language, then we obtain an undecidable global consequence problem for the sublanguage containing only one variable; again, no use will be made of @. Suppose we are working in a language with three modalities. Consider the normal modal logic obtained by adding the following axioms to the minimal logic K: hrihuip ! hdip hdip ! u]hrip:
These (Sahlqvist) axioms correspond to the rst-order frame conditions 8xyz:(Rxy^Uyz) ! Dxz and 8xy:(Dxy ! 8z:(Uxz ! Rzy)), respectively. Mar97] shows that the global satisfaction problem of this logic is undecidable. But then the problem of deciding whether a modal formula in the language with diamonds fhri; hui; hdig globally follows from hrihuix ! hdix and hdix ! u]hrix (that is, the axioms with the propositional variable p replaced by the world variable x) must also be undecidable.
It is at present unknown precisely how many world variables are needed to obtain an undecidable global satisfaction problem for the unimodal case.
Further Work
In their long (if sparse) history, hybrid languages have attracted a number of enthusiastic advocates. Some have claimed that hybridization is a natural way to \power-up" the expressive power of modal languages, others have been impressed by the proof theoretical options they open up, or the ease with which general completeness can be proved. And underlying most of this work lies a simple (and seductive) idea: that by exploiting the notion of formulas as terms to the full, it should be possible to de ne systems which in some sense combine the best of modal and classical techniques.
We believe that the results of this paper con rm the interest of hybridization. For a start, our characterization of H(#; @) shows that relatively simple tools are capable of capturing rst-order fragments that are central from a modal perspective; invariance under generated submodels mirrors the key notion of locality, and it is pleasing that it can be pinned down so simply. Furthermore, the results on interpolation and complexity tend to con rm that we are dealing with a natural collection of ideas, ideas that are well behaved even in relatively weak sublanguages. Finally in writing this paper it has become very clear to us that working with hybrid languages involves a genuine interplay of modal and classical methods (for example, both Ehrenfeucht-Fra ss e games and bisimulations were involved in the expressivity result, and interpolation was proved by blending the modal notion of canonical models with the classical idea of Henkin-models). This is something previous writers on hybrid languages have emphasized (see for example PT91]) and the natural way these methods blend bodes well for further developments.
Nonetheless, to close this paper it seems more appropriate to emphasize what remains to be done; for the blunt fact remains that compared with orthodox modal languages, the study of hybrid languages is in its infancy. Many fundamental questions have not been satisfactorily resolved, and to close the paper we're going to discuss a very obvious one that we regard as particularly important, namely:
Which classes of frames are de nable using H(@) formulas whose only atoms are world variables?
In a sense, the standard translation ST already gives us an answer to this question. Let F be a class of frames de ned by a sentence ' of the rst-order frame language. Then F is de nable by a formula of H(@) whose only atoms are variables i there is some formula in this fragment such that ' is equivalent to the universal closure of ST( ).
Unfortunately, this is not very helpful. Ideally we would like a syntactic characterization of the range of ST when restricted to H(@) formulas whose only atoms are world variables, together with a reverse translation (like our earlier HT). But Using this notion it is easy to show that 9y:(Rxy^Ryy) is not equivalent to an @-formula with one free variable, and that Rxy^Rxz ! 9w:(Ryw^Rzw) is not equivalent to an @-formula in three free variables. And it does tell us something about frame de nability: Corollary 7.2 Let F is a class of frames de ned by a sentence ' of the rst-order frame language. Then F is de nable by a formula of H(@) whose only atoms are variables i ' is equivalent to the universal closure of a formula that is invariant under @-k-bisimulations.
But in practice this characterization does not seem to be particularly helpful. One of the nicer aspects of our characterization of H(#; @) was the way the notion of k-bisimulation linked with the notion of generated submodels to yield a natural \geometric" characterization of de nable frame classes. It is hard to see what the de nition of @-k-bisimulation invariance tells us about frame geometry. Clearly new ideas are called for here.
